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Several theoretical proposals for the evolution of language have sparked a 
renewed search for comparative data on human and non-human animal 
computational capacities. However, conceptual confusions still hinder the 
field, leading to experimental evidence that fails to test for comparable 
human competences. Here we focus on two conceptual and methodological 
challenges that affect the field generally: 1) properly characterizing the com-
putational features of the faculty of language in the narrow sense; 2) 
defining and probing for human language-like computations via artificial 
language learning experiments in non-human animals. Our intent is to be 
critical in the service of clarity, in what we agree is an important approach to 
understanding how language evolved. 
 
 








Within the past several decades, starting with the synthetic reviews of Lieberman 
(1984), Bickerton (1990), and Pinker & Bloom (1990), there has been increasing 
interest and empirical study of the evolution of language (e.g., Fitch 2012, Taller-
man & Gibson 2012). Nevertheless, considerable confusion remains regarding the 
central theoretical issues and core concepts to be engaged, leading to empirical 
studies that are sometimes far off the mark. 
 Perhaps nowhere has this confusion been greater than in reaction to the 
issues raised by Hauser et al. (2002), and this is especially the case with respect to 
comparative studies of artificial language learning in animals (Fitch & Hauser 
2004, Gentner et al. 2006, Murphy et al. 2008, Abe & Watanabe 2011, Rey et al. 
2012). Here we focus on two problems that have hindered work in this area, 
especially its potential contribution to linguistics, cognitive science, neuroscience, 
and evolutionary biology.  
 First, despite broad interest in the mechanisms underlying the capacity for 
language, and especially what is unique to humans and to language, studies with 
non-human animals are often not appropriately designed to answer questions 




about these mechanisms; running artificial language learning experiments is non-
trivial (Reber 1967). In particular, several studies focus too narrowly on the prob-
lem of syntactic-like embedding as the defining feature of our uniquely human 
capacity. But this approach is flawed: Embedding is neither necessary nor suffici-
ent for a full description of human language. Furthermore, but far more peri-
pherally, many have incorrectly suggested that Hauser et al.’s (2002) thesis about 
the evolution of language places center-embedding as a core process in human 
linguistic competence. Since several comparative studies of animal computation 
focus on this work, it is important to get it right: Hauser and colleagues speci-
fically suggested that what is unique to humans and unique to language (the 
Faculty of Language in the Narrow Sense, FLN) is recursion and its mappings to the 
sensory-motor and conceptual-intentional systems.  
 Second, standard methodology in this research area—massive training of 
captive animals with reward for ‘correct’ behavior—bears little resemblance to 
experimental child language research, or to child language acquisition (Wanner 
& Gleitman 1982, Ambridge & Lieven 2011); studies of children explore acqui-
sition by means of spontaneous methods, using passive exposure or habituation–
discrimination. Consequently, animal researchers cannot so easily draw 
conclusions about either the trajectory of human language development or its 
computational-representational properties. 
 Our central aim, therefore, is to clarify these conceptual and methodolo-
gical issues, and then end with a few suggestions on how empirical work in this 
important area might progress. 
 
 
2. Testing for Uniquely Human Mechanisms of the Language Faculty 
 
Given the broad set of factors that enter into language, empirical research is only 
tractable by first defining a narrow subset of core linguistic properties. This was 
one motivation for Hauser et al. (2002) to define the language faculty in the 
narrow sense (FLN) as “the abstract linguistic computation system alone, inde-
pendent of the other systems with which it interacts and interfaces” (p. 1571) in 
the language faculty defined broadly (FLB). FLN comprises “the core 
computational mechanisms of recursion as they appear in narrow syntax and the 
mappings to the interfaces with [conceptual-intentional and sensory-motor 
systems]” (p. 1573). The FLN/FLB distinction leaves open, of course, what factors 
are part of FLN and FLB, while establishing methodological criteria for future 
investigation. 
 The FLN/FLB distinction was also developed as a conceptual guide. FLN 
characterizes linguistic competence in the form of recursive (computable) functions 
that generate a discrete infinity of structured expressions, formally analogous to 
the procedure for the inductive generation of sets and so the natural numbers. 
The set of linguistic expressions and the set of natural numbers are thus effectively 
computable in that, though infinite, they are “calculable by finite means” (Turing 
1936: 230). For example, a function—a finite representation—can be specified to 
generate the infinite, nonrandom decimal expansion of !. Because this expansion 
is infinite, it cannot be physically represented as such. However this is an 




independent—and arbitrary—fact of the performance mechanisms that implement 
the finite function; ! does not cease to be a computable number if the physical 
resources required to calculate it are exhausted, or even nonexistent. It is in this 
same sense that FLN is a competence system—a system of recursively generated 
discrete infinity—logically isolable from the performance systems with which it 
interfaces to form FLB.  
 FLN qua recursive function is thus typified by three essential properties 
(see Watumull et al. 2014 for further discussion): (i) computability, (ii) definition by 
induction, and (iii) mathematical induction. Computability is reflected in a 
procedure—equivalent to a type of Turing machine, discussed below—that 
generates new and complex representations by combining and manipulating 
discrete symbols. The computable function must be defined by a sophisticated 
form of induction: Outputs must be carried forward and returned as inputs to 
generate a hierarchical structure over which can be defined complex relations 
(e.g., syntactic, semantic, phonological, etc.). In technical terms, the function 
strongly generates structures corresponding to weakly generated strings (e.g., the 
weakly generated string the boy saw the man with binoculars is one string with (at 
least) two syntactic structures, {{the, boy}, {saw, {the, man}}, {with, binoculars}} 
and {the, {boy, {saw, {the, {man, {with, binoculars}}}}}}, corresponding to (at least) 
two different semantic interpretations). Finally, mathematical induction is 
realized in the jump from finite to infinite, as in the projection from a finite set of 
words to an infinite set of sentences. 
 Given this specification of FLN, it is false to conflate recursive functions 
with center-embedded (CE) patterns of the form anbn (e.g., the antelope [a1] the lion 
[a2] ate [b2] ran like a snail [b1]). The most recent example of this error is by Rey et 
al. (2012) in experiments with baboons: “[T]he central claim [of Hauser et al. 2002 
is] that the ability to process CE structures is a critical cognitive feature dis-
tinguishing human from nonhuman communication” (p. 180). Following this line 
of argument, ‘success’ by non-human animals in processing CE structures leads 
to the overly strong conclusion that, “[c]ontrary to the commonly accepted claim 
that recursion is human specific[,] CE structures produced by humans could have 
their origins in associative and working memory processes already present in 
animals” (p. 182–183). 
 As noted, this conclusion is problematic because it falsely equates center-
embedding with recursion, and more narrowly, attributes to Hauser et al. (2002) 
the incorrect thesis that the ability to process CE patterns is what defines FLN. 
The correct thesis is that FLN characterizes the uniquely human character of 
language. To repeat, Hauser et al. proposed that FLN comprises “the core com-
putational mechanisms of recursion as they appear in narrow syntax and the 
mappings to the interfaces with [conceptual-intentional and sensory-motor 
systems]” (p. 1573). Recursion, as noted in this hypothesis, was understood in the 
standard mathematical sense given above. Expressions generated by this system 
may be (center-)embedded or not; whether a function is recursive or not is inde-
pendent of the form—or even existence—of its output. Theorems from the formal 
sciences (e.g., the work by Rice, Ackermann, and others) demonstrate that in 
general it is exceedingly difficult to infer anything truly germane as to the nature 
of a computational mechanism from patterns in its outputs. Consequently, test-




ing for the ability to process (center-)embedding does not constitute a test of the 
FLN claim, contrary to what is claimed by Rey et al. (2012) and studies on which 
it builds. Here we work through the Rey et al. study as an illustration of these 
problems, but note that they arise in other work as well (e.g., Gentner et al. 2006, 
Murphy et al. 2008, Abe & Watanabe 2011).  
 In the Rey et al. (2012) experiments, captive baboons were conditioned to 
associate pairs of visual shapes aibi to test whether they would order selection of 
those shapes in a ‘center-embedded’ aiajbjai pattern. Rey et al. summarize their 
results: “[B]aboons spontaneously ordered their responses in keeping with a 
recursive, centre-embedding structure” (p. 180). They then conclude that “the 
production of CE structures in baboons and humans could be the by-product of 
associative mechanisms and working memory constraints” (p. 183). In other 
words, neither baboons nor humans are endowed with FLN—a surprising and un-
evidenced result in the case of humans. This non sequitur derives from the failure 
to distinguish associative processes from recursive computations. 
 Association is indeed the most parsimonious explanation of the baboon 
results: intensive, repetitive, conditioned associative learning that is ubiquitous in 
the animal kingdom, from invertebrates to vertebrates (Gallistel 1990). As Rey et 
al. observe, “the [baboon’s] preference for producing CE structures requires (1) 
the capacity to form associations between pairs of elements (e.g., a1b1 or a2b2) 
and (2) the ability to segment these associations and maintain in working me-
mory the first element of a pair (a1) in order to produce later its second associated 
element (b1). [T]hese two requirements are satisfied in baboons and are sufficient 
for producing CE structures having one-level-of-embedding” (p. 182). Two impli-
cations follow. 
 For Rey et al., the ‘language’ to be recognized is strictly finite, in the form 
aiajbjai for i, j = 1, …, 6 (with i, j distinct). As such, it is unnecessary to posit any 
embedded structure—let alone any underlying grammar—to correctly recognize 
this language. Furthermore, such a result runs precisely counter to the original 
aim of the study: Instead of showing that baboons are endowed with a capacity 
that parallels the characteristic unboundedness of human language, it shows that 
baboons display a finite, bounded processing ability. Second, if association 
suffices for ‘one-level-of-embedding’, this in turn implies that the extension of 
such an ability to process two levels of embedding would demand extensive 
additional training (i.e. listing additional associations), a result that has been 
amply demonstrated as fatal in connectionist networks (Berwick 1982, Elman 
1991), and is fundamentally different from human language acquisition.  
 Another way in which Rey et al. err can be seen in the fact that the linguistic 
patterns that are ‘easy’ and ‘difficult’ for people to process do not align well with 
center-embedded word sequences and their possible foils—such patterns are 
both too strong and too weak. As noted by Rogers & Hauser (2010), while people 
find language patterns in the form anbn difficult to process (e.g., peoplen leftn (e.g., 
people people people left left left)), their corresponding paraphrased forms (people 
who were left (by people who were left)n left (e.g., people who were left by people who 
were left left)) seem easier for people to analyze; several authors, including Rey et 
al., assume that these latter patterns are within the reach of non-human animal 
abilities. Notably, the processing of center-embedded structures in humans is 




known to be limited by working memory, a point acknowledged by Rey et al., as 
well as from the classic studies by Miller & Isard (1964). But memory by itself is 
not an ability or competence. As Rey et al. acknowledge, it is simply the work-
space within which particular procedures are executed. Human performance in 
such cases can be extended indefinitely without any change to the internal 
‘program’ (competence) if time and access to external memory are increased 
(Miller & Chomsky 1963); and far from being unfalsifiable (see Gentner et al. 2006 
for such a claim), the independent existence of a particular linguistic competence 
can be demonstrated by varying performance as a function of computational 
complexity. In contrast, this effect has not been demonstrated in baboons, nor is it 
obvious how one would run the relevant tests.  
 Rey et al. conclude that “increasing the levels-of-embedding could be too 
demanding for baboons” (p. 182), and then speculate that “[a]lthough the present 
results indicate that baboons are not qualitatively limited in processing CE 
structures, their performance could be limited quantitatively to the processing of 
one or two embeddings” (p. 182). But this is misleading. Rey et al. provide no 
evidence to indicate that the qualitative limits do not simply reduce to 
quantitative limits, that is, that an unlimited competence underlies the baboons’ 
limited performance. Finally, as Rogers & Hauser (2010) observe, center-
embedded anbn patterns correspond to the ‘simplest’ possible kind of embedding 
structure. For example, they allow for Sentences embedded within other 
Sentences (e.g., John knows that the baboon learned language), but not Sentences 
embedded within Noun Phrases, as in relative clauses (e.g., the baboon who learned 
language), let alone many other constructions in human language. In short, anbn 
patterns—the proxy for center-embedded structure—are simply not what is 
essential to FLN; they are not good ‘human language detectors’, being both too 
simple and too complex. This critique holds independently of the method used to 
demonstrate how individuals acquire such patterns, a point we explore below. 
 To think that human linguistic competence can be reduced to association 
and working memory reveals a misunderstanding of the critical difference 
between a look-up table—a finite list of associations—and a Turing machine—a 
mathematical model of computation represented by a control unit of stored 
instructions and an unbounded read/write memory tape enabling unbounded 
computation. If one takes the computational theory of the mind/brain seriously, 
it is the Turing machine (or one of its formal equivalents) that serves as the 
natural model for human cognition, including language; the look-up table is a 
nonstarter (see Gallistel & King 2009).  
 The distinction between finite and infinite memory, more specifically the 
independence of assumptions about working memory from those about syntactic 
competence, has proved fruitful for the bulk of research in human syntax during 
the past sixty or so years. While it is true that the human brain is finite, and so 
could be represented as a (large) finite-state machine or look-up table, this isn’t 
relevant. The set of outputs a human can generate is in principle unlimited and, 
importantly, non-arbitrary, (i.e. the set of outputs is nonrandom, inclusion in the 
set being determined by the generative function). It is infinite models of these 
finite systems that yield scientific insight (see Turing 1954 on the generate/look-
up distinction). 




 Consider human arithmetical competence. Here, the finite/infinite distinc-
tion seems so clearly necessary that the cognitive science literature assumes 
without question that this competence is somehow internalized (perhaps not 
transparently) in the form of some finite set of rules; it further assumes that these 
rules, unmodified for any particular arithmetic task, determine an infinite—and 
non-arbitrary—range of outputs. Here, performance may be ‘truncated’ by 
working memory, among many other factors, in recognizable ways (e.g., Hitch 
1978, Dehaene 1999, Trotzke et al. 2013). Indeed, multiplication cannot even be 
carried out by a finite-state machine. What is required for multiplication is 
something similar to a Turing machine with a potentially unbounded input/ 
output tape, so that intermediate results can be written to an external tape and 
carried forward (‘recursed’) to later stages of the computation. Any purely 
association-based method must fail at some point. Yet no one doubts that people 
have internalized the rules for multiplication (operating on an internal tape). Nor 
is there any confusion that the same holds for any physically realizable computer, 
like a laptop. Unsurprisingly, in all cases, the infinite model yields the proper 
theory for the physically realized device. 
 Arithmetical competence corresponds in many important respects with 
linguistic competence. As observed above, both arithmetic and language are sys-
tems of digital infinity, each enumerating inductively a potentially infinite and 
non-arbitrary set of discretely structured objects via computable functions. As 
Chomsky (1959) noted, the grammar for generating a set of linguistic expressions 
can be characterized as a function mapping the integers onto this set. As hypo-
thesized for FLN (Watumull 2012), the discrete elements of a syntactic expression 
(e.g., words) are read as input and, as instructed by internalized linguistic rules 
(principles and parameters, etc.), combined into sets (e.g., phrases) and written 
onto the memory ‘tape’ to be carried forward as ‘intermediate results’, serving as 
inputs to subsequent computations. This enables the unbounded combination of 
words into phrases, and phrases into sentences, and sentences into discourses. 
 The generative process just described is essentially the “iterative concep-
tion of a set”, with sets of discrete objects, linguistic or arithmetic, “recursively 
generated at each stage” such that “the way sets are inductively generated” is 
formally equivalent to “the way the natural numbers […] are inductively gener-
ated” (Boolos 1971: 223). Thus both language and arithmetic draw on similar gen-
erative procedures, a point reiterated in Hauser et al. (2002). Though non-human 
animals appear to be able to carry out some arithmetical operations using analog 
quantity representations, or perhaps subitizing for small integers, there seems to 
be no evidence for anything resembling the computable rule systems sketched 
above or the inductive generalization to an unbounded domain of structured 
arithmetical expressions. Even when animals are taught the Arabic integers 
through reinforcement, they never acquire anything remotely like the successor 
function, generalizing beyond the trained input (Kawai & Matsuzawa 2000). 
Moreover, and of direct relevance to the methodology of most animal studies in 
this area including the artificial language studies discussed here, the research on 
animal integer processing also demonstrates that this capacity is entirely different 
from children’s development of arithmetical competence: Animals never exhibit 
the kind of inductive leap (the best evidence for discrete infinity) that all children 




take once they have acquired knowledge about the first few integers (Leslie et al. 
2008, Carey 2011). What is required is some way to carry forward arbitrarily 
large, inductively generated intermediate results, say by means of an arbitrarily 
long input/output tape (mentally represented), as in the multiplication and syn-
tactic examples described earlier. 
 
 
3. Methodology for Experiments with Non-Human Animals 
 
Understanding how behavior is acquired is essential to comparative inquiry. It is 
particularly important in work on artificial language learning because children 
do not acquire language by means of massive, long-term training. Further, a 
hallmark of virtually all aspects of language acquisition is the inductive aspect of 
recursion: Once a particular component of linguistic competence develops, it 
rapidly generalizes to a virtually limitless range of possible expressions. In the 
case of most work on artificial language learning, whether on birds, rodents, or 
primates, the method entails massive training with little evidence of anything 
remotely resembling unbounded generalizations. The animals seem merely to be 
compiling a list—a look-up table—rather than internalizing rules. Thus, even if 
one were to grant that animals exhibit certain linguistic-like behaviors, their 
mode of acquisition is nothing like that evidenced by human children, and 
whatever has been acquired appears extremely bounded in its expressive power.  
 A counter-example to this approach is the original study of finite-state and 
phrase-structure grammars by Fitch & Hauser (2004) with cotton-top tamarins, 
and pursued in a slightly different way by Abe & Watanabe (2011) in Bengalese 
finches. Here, the method paralleled those used by researchers working on 
artificial language learning in human infants, and in particular, a familiarization-
discrimination technique. In brief, this technique exposes subjects in a passive 
listening context to the relevant input, and then follows with presentations of 
exemplars that match the input as well as exemplars that are different in some 
fundamental way. If subjects have picked up on the pattern inherent in the fami-
liarization phase, they should respond more intensely to the exemplars in the 
discrimination phase that are different than to those that are the same. 
 Though this technique captures the spontaneity of processing that is 
characteristic of language processing, it suffers from at least two problems. First, 
unlike the training techniques that involve highly objective and robust behavioral 
measures (e.g., touching a button), the familiarization-discrimination techniques 
involve a more subjective and ambiguous response: looking time or looking 
orientation. Despite methods designed to provide relatively high inter-observer 
reliabilities, these remain relatively fragile techniques, due in part to the often 
small differences in response measures across conditions (often a matter of a 
couple of seconds). Second, and more importantly, in studies of non-human 
animals, where the test population is extremely limited and small, it is necessary 
to run different conditions with the same population. This is not the case in 
studies of human infants where different conditions are tested on different popu-
lations. Given the limited test population, animals often habituate to the general 
test environment, and further, are exposed to many different conditions, thereby 
changing their experience over multiple conditions. 




 We are thus left with a spontaneous method that cannot deliver the 
requisite information about processing capacities that are like child language 
acquisition, or a training method that can potentially identify an ability, but one 
that may well be fundamentally different from what is in play for human child-
ren during acquisition. In other words, even if a training study shows that an 
animal can ‘compute’ center-embedded patterns, the underlying representations 
are likely to be entirely different because of the procedures used to demonstrate 
this capacity. In any event, such methods have, thus far, failed to demonstrate the 





What results with non-human animals might challenge the claim that the 
language faculty is uniquely human? And more narrowly, what evidence might 
refute the hypothesis proposed by Hauser et al. (2002) regarding the composition 
of FLN? With respect to the generative component of their thesis, and in parti-
cular, its focus on recursive mechanisms, it would be necessary to show that ani-
mals spontaneously respond to stimuli that are characterized by (i) computability, 
(ii) definition by induction, and (iii) mathematical induction—the three properties 
typical of linguistic recursion that we briefly noted above. Computability re-
quires proof of a procedure that generates new and complex representations by 
combining and manipulating symbols, as in human language; this productive pro-
cess is to be contrasted with the retrieval of representations from a look-up table 
(finite and innately specified or memorized), as in non-human primate calls. The 
computable function must be defined by a sophisticated form of induction: 
Outputs must be carried forward and returned as inputs to strongly generate a hie-
rarchical structure over which can be defined complex relations (e.g., syntactic, 
semantic, phonological, etc.); this also implies the discreteness of representations. 
Lastly, mathematical induction is seen in the jump from finite to infinite. This can 
be demonstrated by significant generalization beyond the exposure material (e.g., 
counting indefinitely beyond the training set) and by revealing an unbounded 
competence underlying bounded performance. 
 In conclusion, to advance this important field, greater conceptual and 
methodological clarity is necessary (for recent discussions, see Fitch & Friederici 
2013, Zuidema 2013). Conceptually, it is necessary to understand the formal 
aspects of recursive functions in order to capture the fundamental generative and 
unbounded properties of all natural languages (where embedding is an inter-
esting but incidental phenomenon). Experiments should focus on all aspects of 
the Turing-like architecture of the faculty of language in its narrow sense: aspects 
of the enumeration by finitary procedures and read/write memory of a non-
arbitrary digital infinity of hierarchically structured expressions and relations. 
Devising such tests may prove difficult, but this is the critical challenge for a 
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